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Ding Dong! The Count is Dead, or
Is It?: Criminal Defendants May
Not Directly Appeal Convictions if
Unresolved Counts are on the Dead
Docket
Lilly B. Nickels*
I. INTRODUCTION
A defendant is indicted on two criminal counts, is found guilty on one
of those counts, and is sentenced to time in prison. However, the jury
could not come to a decision on the other count, so the trial court judge
places the count on the court’s dead docket where the count could remain
for an indefinite period of time, deeming the defendant’s case pending in
the trial court. Due to the defendant’s case being classified as pending,
the defendant does not have the right to a direct appeal. The defendant
must helplessly serve prison time without any idea as to when the count
will come off the dead docket1 or when the defendant will be able to appeal
the conviction and sentence. This outcome is a product of the General
Assembly’s language in section 5-6-34(a)(1) of the Official Code of Georgia

*Foremost,

I would like to extend a special thanks to Mercer Law Review for fostering such
an encouraging learning environment and allowing me to flourish as a writer. I would also
like to thank Professor James P. Fleissner for his guidance and constant encouragement
during the process of writing this Casenote. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to
thank my wonderful family for the endless love and support they have given me throughout
my life.
1. In Danforth v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court mentioned the typical length of
time for cases to remain on the dead docket (specifically discussing what happens when
arrests are not made for persons who have bench warrants and instead announcing “no
appearance” at several different terms of court). Justice Hall noted that not arresting
individuals on bench warrants “carried [cases] to the ‘dead docket,’ where they, in most
instances, slept the sleep of death, and knew no resurrection . . . .” 75 Ga. 614, 621 (1885).
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Annotated.2 After a defendant attempted to appeal his sentence while
one of his criminal counts was on the dead docket and was subsequently
denied, the Georgia Supreme Court set out to analyze and clarify the
meaning of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1) in Seals v. State.3
When the defendant in Seals was found guilty on one count of his twocount indictment while the other count was placed on the dead docket,
he directly appealed his conviction and sentence.4 The Georgia Court of
Appeals denied his appeal because the dead-docketed count caused the
defendant’s entire case to remain pending in the lower court. After
granting a writ of certiorari, the Georgia Supreme Court reviewed the
appellate court’s dismissal and subsequently upheld the dismissal after
it interpreted the final judgment rule set out in O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1)
and held that a dead-docketed count was undecided and left the entire
case pending in the lower court.5
The supreme court’s analysis of the final judgment rule in O.C.G.A.
§ 5-6-34(a)(1) and the rule’s treatment of dead-docketed counts provides
clarity as to when a defendant can directly appeal their conviction, as
well as a defendant’s alternative options when a direct appeal is not
available.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Demarquis Seals was indicted by a grand jury in June of 2017 on one
count of rape and one count of child molestation.6 In October of 2018,
Seals was tried before a jury on both counts, and he was found guilty of
child molestation. However, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the
rape count, so the Superior Court of Douglas County declared a mistrial
as to that count. The trial court sentenced Seals to twenty years in prison
on the count of child molestation and noted that the count of rape was to
be re-tried due to the declaration of a mistrial. Shortly after, the trial
court placed the count of rape on the “dead docket.”7
On the day of his sentencing, Seals filed a motion for a new trial, but
in August of 2019, the trial court denied the motion.8 Seals filed a notice
of appeal to the Georgia Court of Appeals, and the court later dismissed
the appeal. The appellate court determined that since Seals had a deaddocketed count, his case was still pending in the trial court under
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1) (2021).
311 Ga. 739, 860 S.E.2d 419 (2021).
Id. at 739, 860 S.E.2d at 421.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1), and therefore, Seals was required to follow the
procedures for an interlocutory appeal under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b)9 as to
the child molestation conviction and sentence.10
The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether the
court of appeals erred in dismissing Seals’s appeal.11 Since the trial
court’s ruling did not constitute a final judgment under O.C.G.A.
§ 5-6-34(a)(1), and Seals did not follow the required procedures to seek
an interlocutory appeal under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b), the supreme court
affirmed the appellate court’s dismissal of Seals’s appeal.12
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Defendant’s Right to Appeal Under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1)
Immediate appeals may be taken from final judgments, which
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1) describes as “where the case is no longer pending
in the court below[.]”13 The concept of this statute is longstanding in
statutory law. Georgia Code of 1868, section 4191,14 the predecessor to
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1), stated:
No cause shall be carried to the Supreme Court upon any bill of
exceptions, so long as the same is pending in the Court below, unless
the decision or judgment complained of, if it had been rendered as
claimed by the plaintiff in error, would have been a final disposition of
the cause.15

Twenty years after the enactment of section 4191, the Georgia
Supreme Court interpreted its meaning in Zorn v. Lamar.16 The court
held that the statute meant “as long as a defendant remains in the court
below or other issues remain untried there, the case is pending there, and
9. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b) (2021).
10. On January 11, 2021, the trial court entered an order taking the rape count off the
dead docket and, on the same day, entered an order of nolle prosequi (“[a]n entry made on
the record, by which the prosecutor . . . declares that he will proceed no further[,]”) as to the
count, leading Seals’s case to have a final judgment on the child molestation conviction and
sentence. A notice of appeal was filed to the Georgia Court of Appeals on February 10, 2021,
and Seals’s appeal was on the appellate court’s calendar for January 2022. Supplemental
Brief of Petitioner at 2, Seals v. State, 311 Ga. 739, 860 S.E.2d 419 (2021) (No. S20C0931);
Nolle Prosequi, WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1856).
11. Seals, 311 Ga. at 739, 860 S.E.2d at 421.
12. Id.
13. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1).
14. Georgia Code of 1868 section 4191.
15. Id.
16. 71 Ga. 80 (1883).
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no final judgment has been had[.]”17 In 1965, the language of section 4191
was replaced by the enactment of the Appellate Practice Act.18 Although
the language of the current O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1) has evolved
throughout the years, no decision indicates that the meaning of the
statute has been materially changed regarding the embodiment of a final
judgment. 19
1. Interpreting Statutes
The issue in Seals is one of statutory construction, so it was necessary
for the court to carefully and accurately interpret O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1).
When the Georgia Supreme Court was interpreting a statute in Deal v.
Coleman,20 the court noted that “[w]hen we consider the meaning of a
statute, ‘we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said
and said what it meant.’”21 The court then said that statutory text should
be given its “‘plain and ordinary meaning[]’”22 and read in its “most
natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English
language would.”23 In order to give a statute its ordinary public meaning,
courts must read the words of the statute in context rather than in
isolation, which includes the “structure and history of the text . . . [and]
statutory and decisional law that forms the legal background of the
written text.”24
The court applied these standards when answering the issue in Seals.
First, it had to determine whether a “case” that consists of multiple
counts is still “pending” when one or more of the counts remains
unresolved.
2. Ordinary Public Meaning of “Case” and “Pending”
The ordinary public meaning of the word “case,” when used in a legal
capacity, is a “legal action or suit[.]”25 When courts refer to a case, it is
generally thought to encompass all charges against a defendant.
17. Id. at 82.
18. Appellate Practice Act (1965).
19. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1).
20. 294 Ga. 170, 751 S.E.2d 337 (2013).
21. Id. at 172, 751 S.E.2d at 341 (quoting Arby’s Restaurant Group, Inc. v. McRae, 292
Ga. 243, 245, 734 S.E.2d 55, 57 (2012)).
22. Id. (quoting City of Atlanta v. City of College Park, 292 Ga. 741, 744, 741 S.E.2d
147, 149 (2013)).
23. Id. at 172–73, 751 S.E.2d at 341.
24. City of Guyton v. Barrow, 305 Ga. 799, 805, 828 S.E.2d 366, 371 (2019).
25. Case, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 219 (2d
college ed. 1980); “[A] single proceeding, regardless of whether the proceeding involves one
or multiple counts.” Seals, 311 Ga. at 743, 860 S.E.2d at 423.
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Similarly, “pending,” when used generally, means “not decided,
determined, or established.”26 This term is widely used throughout legal
proceedings when a case or individual count is unresolved. Applying
these terms to a case that includes multiple counts, it follows that if one
of the counts in the case is pending, the case is also pending, thus the
judgment is not final.
B. Georgia Supreme Court’s Prior Decisions Regarding Final Judgments
The Georgia Supreme Court has issued several decisions regarding the
final judgment rule embodied in O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1). In Keller v.
State,27 the Cobb County Superior Court failed to enter a written
conviction and sentence on the last count of Gerald Keller’s multi-count
indictment after the jury announced the verdict.28 At this time, Keller’s
case was “not ripe for appeal . . . even though the trial court did enter a
written judgment of conviction and sentence on the other counts of the
indictment.”29 Once the trial court entered a written sentence on the last
count of the indictment, Keller filed a timely appeal to the Georgia Court
of Appeals. This appeal was subsequently dismissed. A writ of certiorari
was then granted by the Georgia Supreme Court to determine whether
the dismissal of Keller’s appeal by the court of appeals was erroneous.
The supreme court held that “when multiple counts of an indictment are
tried together and the trial court does not enter a written sentence on one
or more of the counts, the case is still pending in the trial court and is not
a final judgment under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1).”30 Thus, since Keller filed
a timely appeal after the trial court entered a written judgment on the
last count, the supreme court held that the court of appeals erred in
dismissing the appeal.31
Similar to Keller, the Georgia Supreme Court in State v. Outen,32
interpreted O.C.G.A. § 5-7-2,33 which sets out the state’s required
procedures for appealing when no final judgment has been entered.34 In

26. Pending, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1050 (2d
college ed. 1980).
27. 275 Ga. 680, 571 S.E.2d 806 (2002).
28. Id. at 681, 571 S.E.2d at 808.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 681, 571 S.E.2d at 807–08.
31. Id. at 681, 571 S.E.2d at 808.
32. 289 Ga. 579, 714 S.E.2d 581 (2011).
33. O.C.G.A. § 5-7-2 (2021).
34. Id.
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that case, David Outen filed a special demurrer35 on count one of the
indictment which was subsequently granted by the Clarke Superior
Court, and the state appealed.36 The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court’s grant of a special demurrer and filed a petition for a writ
of certiorari to the supreme court. After granting the writ of certiorari,
the supreme court held that “[t]he trial court’s order dismissing [c]ount
[one] of the indictment [was] not a final order[.] Count [two] remain[ed]
in the trial court. Accordingly, by the plain terms of O.C.G.A. § 5-7-2, a
certificate of immediate review was required.”37 Since the state did not
follow the required procedures for a certificate of immediate review laid
out in O.C.G.A. § 5-7-2,38 the court of appeals did not have appellate
jurisdiction to affirm the trial court’s dismissal.39
Although Keller and Outen concern different circumstances than those
in Seals and do not explicitly reference the dead docket, these cases show
that if one or more counts of a multi-count indictment are pending in the
court below, there is not a final judgment, and none of the counts can be
appealed.40
1. The Final Judgment Rule as Applied in Civil Cases
The final judgment rule in O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1) is also applicable in
civil cases.41 In Keck v. Harris,42 the appellant filed a complaint for
modification of child support, and he also sought for the Cobb County
Superior Court to declare that Georgia’s Child Support Guidelines were
unconstitutional under the United States Constitution’s Supremacy
Clause.43 After the trial court issued an order denying the appellant’s
constitutional challenge, the appellant filed a motion for discretionary
review of the order to the Georgia Supreme Court. The supreme court

35. “In a special demurrer, a defendant claims that the charges in the indictment are
‘imperfect as to form or that the accused is entitled to more information.’” Hinkson v. State,
310 Ga. 388, 392, 850 S.E.2d 41, 47 (2020) (quoting Bullard v. State, 307 Ga. 482, 486, 837
S.E.2d 348, 353 (2019)).
36. Outen, 289 Ga. at 580, 714 S.E.2d at 582.
37. Id. at 581, 714 S.E.2d at 583.
38. O.C.G.A. § 5-7-2.
39. Outen, 289 Ga. at 579, 581, 714 S.E.2d at 582–83.
40. Additionally, if one or more counts of a defendant’s multicount indictment are
pending in the court below, the defendant is barred from state and federal habeas corpus
review. Seals, 311 Ga. at 753, 860 S.E.2d at 430 (LaGrua, J., dissenting).
41. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1).
42. 277 Ga. 667, 594 S.E.2d 367 (2004).
43. Id. at 667, 594 S.E.2d at 368–69.
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held that “[t]he trial court’s order [did] not constitute a final judgment,
as the claim for modification remain[ed] pending below.”44
In another civil case, Tyrones v. Tyrones,45 the appellant held joint title
to land in DeKalb County, Georgia with his brother.46 After the
appellant’s brother died, the DeKalb County Probate Court gave a 50%
interest in the land to his brother’s widow, the appellee. The appellee
filed a complaint for statutory partition of the property, and the parties
agreed to have the property appraised, and if needed, the property would
be subject to a partition sale. Almost four years later, the DeKalb County
Superior Court entered an order for the partition-sale process to begin,
and the property was subsequently purchased at the partition sale by the
appellee. Shortly after, the trial court found that the appellant’s purchase
of the property was proper, and it ordered the appellant to turn over the
deed to the property to the appellee.47
The appellee asserted that in order to challenge the partition sale, the
appellant had to file an appeal because the trial court’s order was a final
judgment.48 However, the Georgia Supreme Court held that since there
were unresolved issues—“namely the confirmation of the partition sale
and disposition of the funds from the sale”—and remaining recourse for
the appellant in the trial court—“namely his objection to [the partition]
sale and request for a new one”—the trial court’s order did not constitute
a final judgment.49 The trial court used the following rule to determine
what constitutes a final judgment:
Even if an order does not specify that it is a grant of final judgment, it
nevertheless constitutes a final judgment within the meaning of
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1) where it leaves no issues remaining to be
resolved, constitutes the court’s final ruling on the merits of the action,
and leaves the parties with no further recourse in the trial court.50

C. Criminal Cases and Counts on the Dead Docket
A dead docket is a “procedural device by which the prosecution is
postponed indefinitely but may be reinstated any time at the pleasure of
the court.”51 Placing criminal cases on the dead docket was first
44. Id. at 667, 594 S.E.2d at 369.
45. 300 Ga. 367, 792 S.E.2d 398 (2016).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 369 n.2, 792 S.E.2d at 399.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 370 n.2, 792 S.E.2d at 400.
50. Id. (quoting Forrister v. Manis Lumber Co., 232 Ga. App. 370–71, 501 S.E.2d 606,
608 (1998)).
51. 1 Georgia Criminal Law Case Finder § 22-7 (2021).
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statutorily authorized in Georgia by an 1883 statute which provided that
the superior court clerk was required to keep “a docket of criminal cases,
to be known as the dead docket, to which cases shall be transferred, at
the discretion of the providing judge, and which shall only be called at
his pleasure . . . .”52 That statute was later codified in the 1895 and 1910
Georgia Penal Codes, as well as in the 1933 Georgia Code, and now, with
the exception of some changes in the language, it is known as O.C.G.A.
§ 15-6-61(a)(4)(B).53
Dead-docketing a case does not mean that the case has been
terminated or dismissed, so the defendant’s case remains pending “which
can be called for trial at the judge’s pleasure, or upon which the accused
can make a demand for trial.”54 Because placing a case on the dead docket
does not constitute termination or dismissal, in addition to a defendant
not having the ability to file a direct appeal, a court’s order to dead-docket
a case cannot be appealed by the state pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-7-1(a).55
If a defendant’s case has been placed on the dead docket, the defendant
has the right to demand a speedy trial by using either (1) the statutory
right to demand a speedy trial under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-170,56 or (2) the
constitutional right to demand a speedy trial under the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.57 Thus, to place a case on
the dead docket over a defendant’s objection58 is an abuse of the trial
court’s discretion.59
Since the dead docket is a primary focus in Seals, the supreme court
used Georgia statutes and case law to determine whether any authority
exists that would cause an unresolved, dead-docketed count to be treated
differently when applying the final judgment rule in O.C.G.A.
§ 5-6-34(a)(1).

52. Act of Sept. 25, 1883, § 1, 1882–83 Ga. Laws 55–56; Georgia Penal Code § 797
(1895); Georgia Penal Code § 797 (1910); The Code of Georgia of 1933 § 24-2714(5)(7) (1933).
53. Act of Sept. 25, 1883, § 1, 1882–83 Ga. Laws 55–56; Georgia Penal Code § 797
(1895); Georgia Penal Code § 797 (1910); The Code of Georgia of 1933 § 24-2714(5)(7);
O.C.G.A. § 15-6-61(a)(4)(B) (2019).
54. Courtenay v. Randolph, 125 Ga. App. 581, 583, 188 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1972) (citing
Newman v. State, 121 Ga. App. 692, 175 S.E.2d 144 (1970)).
55. O.C.G.A. § 5-7-1(a) (2021).
56. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-170 (2021).
57. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
58. Seals did not object to the trial court placing the rape count on the dead docket.
Brief of Petitioner at 3, Seals v. State, 311 Ga. 739, 860 S.E.2d 419 (2021) (No. S20C0931).
59. Newman, 121 Ga. App. at 694, 175 S.E.2d at 146.
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1. Statutory Authority for Different Treatment of DeadDocketed Counts
No statutory authority exists in Georgia law that suggests that
untried, dead-docketed counts should be treated differently when
applying the final judgment rule set out in O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1).60
There are three Georgia statutes that explicitly reference the dead
docket, but none of these statutes indicate that dead-docketing a count
would result in a final judgment for the count.
The first statute, O.C.G.A. § 15-6-61(a)(4)(B), provides that
maintaining a criminal case management system that reflects “entries of
cases which are ordered dead docketed[]” is the duty of the superior court
clerk. 61 The second statute, O.C.G.A. section 17-6-31(c),62 declares that a
principal will be surrendered if the case is dead-docketed before a
judgment is entered,63 and section 17-6-31(d)(1)64 states that a surety will
be released from liability if the case is dead-docketed before a judgment
is entered.65 The third statute, O.C.G.A. section 35-3-37(j)(3),66 relates to
a defendant being able to restrict access to their criminal history.67
Section 35-3-37(j)(3) allows the restriction of criminal history for a deaddocketed charge when (1) the charge has stayed on the dead docket for
more than twelve months; (2) the individual petitions the court to restrict
access to the criminal history, and the court examines the reasoning for
dead-docketing and the suitability for restricting access; and (3) the
individual does not have any pending active warrants.68
When reading these statutes, there is nothing that indicates that a
dead-docketed count should be treated as a final judgment. Actually, the
manner in which O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(j)(3) treats dead-docketed counts—
the court requiring a count to have been on the dead docket for a time
period of twelve months before analyzing the reasoning for placing the
count on the dead docket69—insinuates that the mere action of placing a
count on the dead docket does not automatically establish a final
judgment.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1).
O.C.G.A. § 15-6-61(a)(4)(B).
O.C.G.A. § 17-6-31(c) (2021).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 17-6-31(d)(1) (2021).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(j)(3) (2021).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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2. Georgia Case Law Authority for Different Treatment of
Dead-Docketed Counts
The Georgia Supreme Court has explicitly referenced using the dead
docket in only two cases. In the first case, Beam v. State,70 a female
companion was with the defendant on the night of his alleged crime and
witnessed the events, and the two individuals had unrelated pending
armed robbery charges.71 Before the defendant’s trial, the Assistant
District Attorney offered to drop the armed robbery charges against the
female companion if she would testify against the defendant regarding
the events that she witnessed. She agreed to this offer, and during the
trial, the Fulton County Superior Court ruled that the jury could be made
aware that the female companion had the charges dismissed, but the
defense could not question her about the armed robbery because that
would allow the state to question the defendant about that unrelated
crime. Two weeks after the female companion testified, her armed
robbery charge was placed on the dead docket.72
Upon review by the Georgia Supreme Court, the court held that
because the female companion was considered to be a key witness against
the defendant, and the armed robbery count on the dead docket did not
constitute a dismissal of the count, the trial court erred in ruling that
questioning of the female would lead to questioning of the defendant.73
When determining that the count on the dead docket was still pending,
the court relied on the Georgia Court of Appeals decision State v. Creel,74
and noted that “[p]lacing a case upon the dead docket certainly
constitutes neither a dismissal nor a termination of the prosecution in
the accused’s favor.”75
In the second case, Phillips v. State,76 the Fulton County Superior
Court placed the defendant’s case on the dead docket.77 Sixteen months
later, the defendant’s case was retried. The defendant appealed and
argued that he was not given sufficient notice of his case being taken off
the dead docket. Emphasizing the fact that the defendant’s attorney did
not request a continuance or cite any precedent supporting the
defendant’s alleged entitlement to heightened notice, the Georgia

70. 265 Ga. 853, 463 S.E.2d 347 (1995).
71. Id. at 853–54, 463 S.E.2d at 348–49.
72. Id. at 855, 463 S.E.2d at 349.
73. Id. at 857, 463 S.E.2d at 350.
74. 216 Ga. App. 394, 454 S.E.2d 804 (1995).
75. Beam, 265 Ga. at 855 n.3, 463 S.E.2d at 349 (quoting Creel, 216 Ga. App. at 395,
454 S.E.2d at 805).
76. 279 Ga. 704, 620 S.E.2d 367 (2005).
77. Id. at 704, 620 S.E.2d at 368.
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Supreme Court held that the argument was not preserved for appellate
review and quoted Beam: “Although the case was placed on the dead
docket after the original trial ended in a mistrial as to the murder charges
that ‘certainly constitute[d] neither a dismissal nor a termination of the
prosecution in the accused’s favor.’”78
Although these two cases do not explicitly address the dead docket’s
applicability to the final judgment rule in O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1), they
make it clear that placing a case or count on the dead docket does not
mean that it is being dismissed or terminated. As a result, the case or
count is still pending regardless of its placement on the dead docket.
IV. COURT’S RATIONALE
Justice Peterson wrote for the majority in Seals, and he examined
several sources and rules of law when analyzing O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1)
as it applies to counts that have been placed on the dead docket. 79 First,
the court emphasized the imperativeness of affording the language of
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1) its plain and ordinary meaning as understood by
an average speaker of the English language. 80 When doing so, it follows
that when one count of a multicount indictment is pending, the entire
case is pending and cannot be appealed.
Second, it is noted that when the current O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1) was
enacted by the legislature in 1984, the Georgia Court of Appeals had
already determined in Courtenay v. Randolph,81 McCord v. Jones,82 and
Webster v. City of East Point,83 that a case on the dead docket was still
pending.84 These cases held that “[p]lacing a case upon the dead docket
certainly constitutes neither a dismissal nor a termination of the
prosecution in the accused’s favor. A case is still pending which can be
called for trial at the judge’s pleasure, or upon which the accused can
make a demand for trial.”85 The General Assembly decided to enact
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1) in the midst of these cases, indicating that the

78. Id. at 705, 620 S.E.2d at 368–69 (2005) (quoting Beam, 265 Ga. at 855 n.3, 463
S.E.2d at 349).
79. Seals, 311 Ga. 739, 860 S.E.2d 419.
80. Id. at 740, 860 S.E.2d at 421–22.
81. 125 Ga. App. 581, 188 S.E.2d 396.
82. 168 Ga. App. 891, 311 S.E.2d 209 (1983).
83. 164 Ga. App. 605, 294 S.E.2d 588 (1982).
84. Seals, 311 Ga. at 748, 860 S.E.2d at 427.
85. Courtenay, 125 Ga. App. at 583, 188 S.E.2d at 397–98 (citing Newman, 121 Ga.
App. 692, 175 S.E.2d 144); McCord, 168 Ga. App. at 892, 311 S.E.2d at 211 (quoting
Courtenay, 125 Ga. App. at 583, 188 S.E.2d at 397–98); see Webster, 164 Ga. App. at 609,
294 S.E.2d at 591 (citing Courtenay, 125 Ga. App. at 583, 188 S.E.2d at 397–98).
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General Assembly did not intend for dead-docketed cases to be treated
differently.86
Third, even under the language of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1), defendants
still have the right to file a certificate of immediate review under
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b).87 Although this process has narrower time
constraints for filing, defendants nevertheless retain this option if they
have not obtained a final judgment. Interpreting O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1)
to mean that defendants cannot appeal without a final judgment does not
negate a defendant’s right to file for a certificate of immediate review
under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b).88
Finally, “the motion for new trial statute uses completely different
language that allows the filing of such a motion.”89 The way that O.C.G.A.
§ 5-6-34(a)(1) is construed by the court does not disturb a defendant’s
right to file a motion for a new trial under O.C.G.A. § 5-5-40(a).90 Along
with a defendant’s right to file a motion for a new trial, the court noted
that it is possible for a “trial court [to] sever the mistried count to allow
the immediate appeal of the counts on which a judgment was entered[]”91
under O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(c).92
Justice LaGrua, writing for the dissent, stressed that “[o]nce a count
is moved to the dead docket, the count is dead.”93 She discussed the
procedure for placing a count on the dead docket, highlighting that once
the count is on the dead docket, it is no longer on the court’s active docket.
Explaining how a count on the dead docket has the potential to be
reinstated and called for trial at any time, Justice LaGrua noted that the
count could also stay on the dead docket for an indefinite period of time,
not allowing the defendant to appeal his conviction. Her opinion is that
at the time Seals filed a direct appeal to the court of appeals for the child
molestation conviction, the rape count was dead. Justice LaGrua
asserted that “to conclude otherwise would render the dead docket

86. Seals, 311 Ga. at 748, 860 S.E.2d at 427.
87. Id. at 750 n.6, 860 S.E.2d at 428.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 750, 860 S.E.2d at 428.
90. O.C.G.A. § 5-5-40(a) (2021) (“All motions for new trial, except in extraordinary
cases, shall be made within [thirty] days of the entry of the judgment on the verdict . . . .”).
91. Seals, 311 Ga. at 750 n.8, 860 S.E.2d at 428.
92. O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(c) (2021) (“When two or more crimes are charged as required by
subsection (b) of this Code section, the court in the interest of justice may order that one or
more of such charges be tried separately.”).
93. Seals, 311 Ga. at 751, 860 S.E.2d at 428 (LaGrua, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
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meaningless, raise serious due process concerns, and potentially thwart
appellate review until an indeterminate, or even non-existent time.”94
To demonstrate that the supreme court has long considered direct
appeals in cases similar to Seals, Justice LaGrua relied on a number of
prior supreme court cases.95 Justice LaGrua strongly encouraged the
General Assembly to amend O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1) to grant defendants
the right to directly appeal counts that have been placed on the dead
docket.96 She believes that if the statute is not amended, it will “upend
years of trial court practice where the dead docket procedure has been
utilized for a myriad of practical, strategic, and economic reasons and
will leave defendants without a meaningful and effectual method to
appeal their convictions.”97 Concluding that Seals’s case was not pending
after his rape count was placed on the dead docket and his motion for
new trial was denied, Justice LaGrua declared that Seals had the right
to a direct appeal under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1).98
V. IMPLICATIONS
While the meaning of a final judgment under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1)
has been addressed by the courts many times throughout the years, the
matter in Seals regarding whether a dead-docketed count impacts a final
judgment was one of first impression for the Georgia Supreme Court.
There are at least four implications that stem from the court’s decision
in Seals.
First, the court’s interpretation of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1) provides
clarity in the law for defendants and their counsel when determining the
proper motions and notices to file in the defendant’s case. Although
Seals’s appeal of the child molestation conviction and sentence was on
the Georgia Court of Appeals’s calendar for January 2022,99 if a
certificate of immediate review would have been properly filed when he
was convicted in 2018, he could have been granted an appeal much sooner
and avoided the years of litigation that he has endured. The court’s
94. Id. at 753, 860 S.E.2d at 430 (LaGrua, J., dissenting).
95. See Pender v. State, 311 Ga. 98, 856 S.E.2d 302 (2021); Terrell v. State, 304 Ga.
183, 815 S.E.2d 66 (2018); Faust v. State, 302 Ga. 211, 805 S.E.2d, 826 (2017); Walker v.
State, 295 Ga. 688, 763 S.E.2d 704 (2014); Jones v. State, 284 Ga. 672, 670 S.E.2d 790
(2008); Taylor v. State, 282 Ga. 44, 644 S.E.2d 850 (2007); Thomas v. State, 279 Ga. 363,
613 S.E.2d 620 (2005); Grier v. State, 273 Ga. 363, 541 S.E.2d 369 (2001).
96. Seals, 311 Ga. at 756, 860 S.E.2d at 432 (LaGrua, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. The fact that Seals obtained a final judgment before he was granted a direct appeal
further affirms the appropriateness of the court’s ruling. Supplemental Brief of Petitioner
at 2, Seals v. State, 311 Ga. 739, 860 S.E.2d 419 (2021) (No. S20C0931).
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clarification in the law will help future defendants avoid unnecessary and
extended litigation, and it will also help to decrease the number of
motions and other related filings coming through the courts.
Second, although the court ruled that dead-docketed counts are
pending in the trial court and prevent defendants from successfully
seeking a direct appeal, other routes for recourse remain available to
criminal defendants. The court’s interpretation of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1)
brings to light a defendant’s alternate options, which include the ability
to file for a certificate of immediate review under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b),100
the right to file a motion for new trial under O.C.G.A. § 5-5-40(a),101 the
statutory right to demand a speedy trial under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-170,102
and the constitutional right to demand a speedy trial under the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.103 Clarifying the meaning
of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1) allows for the proper use of other statutes that
are applicable to defendants that have not obtained a final judgment on
their case.
Third, the supreme court’s interpretation of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1)
and its result for defendants raises policy concerns regarding the General
Assembly potentially amending O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1) to grant
defendants the right to a direct appeal where unresolved counts are on
the dead docket. Amending the statute’s language to allow these
immediate appeals would eliminate the appellate prerequisites of a count
being ordered nolle prosequi, dismissed, or the need for a retrial.
Additionally, with the current language of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1)104 that
gives a dead-docketed count the ability to indefinitely postpone an
appeal, there is a risk that some judges and prosecutors could abuse the
statute by placing a count on the dead docket to interfere with a
defendant’s appellate rights. However, addressing those concerns is only
appropriate for the General Assembly.
Finally, if the court had ruled in line with the defendant’s and dissent’s
position in Seals, it is possible that the result would have led to some
“unwanted piecemeal appeals.” A criminal defendant having the right to
directly appeal a case without a final judgment is inconsistent with
appellate procedure. Under the court’s ruling, the court of appeals has
jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal only when the case has a final
judgment—a concept that has been longstanding for over 150 years in
criminal and civil law.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(b).
O.C.G.A. § 5-5-40(a).
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-170.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(1).

